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I. INTRODUCTION
The rising federal civil caseload continues to create unbridled
problems of expense and delay. Whether due to the sheer volume of
cases or the increased complexity of litigation, the judicial system
seems unable to adapt and respond. The courts' decreasing ability to
effectively resolve its crises has led to much discourse, suggesting the
necessity for change and improvement of the system,' some of which
have been implemented.2 Nevertheless, these changes have failed to
improve the administration and execution of civil justice in any sig-
nificant way.3
These problems raise important questions about managing the ex-
panding dockets without sacrificing fairness to litigants in each case
and to the public at large.4 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a
1. Over 10 years ago, the Department of Justice prepared a document addressing
this issue. See Report of the Department of Justice Commission on the Revision of the
Federal Justice System, The Needs of the Federal Courts (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter Ro-
senberg Report]. The concerns raised and suggestions offered in this report remain
relevant today.
2. For example, federal magistrates have assumed more responsibility over fed-
eral caseload, assisting district court judges in a variety of tasks, and presiding over
civil cases if parties consent. See Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat.
1107 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. §§ 202, 3006A, 3041,
3045, 3060, 3102, 3116, 3184, 3191, 3195, 3401-02, 3771 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631-639 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have been amended twice, in 1980 and 1983, to better facilitate judicial management of
the crushing caseloads.
3. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1987 Annual Report of
the Director (1987); Administrative Office of the United States Courts Statistical Anal-
ysis & Reports Division, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics (Mar. 1987). Moreover,
the administrative problems on the civil side of the federal docket are certain to
worsen when the impact of the Sentencing Guidelines is recognized. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-86 (1982 & Supp. 1986) (codification of sentencing guidelines).
4. Former Chief Justice Burger recognized the need for the judicial system to im-
plement alternatives:
Experimentation with new methods in the judicial system is imperative given
growing caseloads, delays, and increasing costs. Federal and state judges
throughout the country are trying new approaches to discovery, settlement
negotiations, trial and alternatives to trial that deserve commendation and
support .... Legal educators and scholars can provide a valuable service by
studying new approaches and reporting successful innovations that can serve
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mechanism to which lawyers, litigants, and courts are turning with
increasing frequency to save time and money normally required by
traditional civil litigation.5 With broad support throughout the coun-
try, ADR may be the most expedient and viable approach to solving
the federal court crisis.6 Proponents of ADR maintain that a quick
and fair result will be obtained in individual cases, thereby benefiting
the system as a whole.7
Many district court judges utilize ADR techniques to expedite their
congested dockets. Indeed, many have experimented effectively with
different methods, including, for example, the summary jury trial.8
Furthermore, various district courts have adopted local rules author-
izing experimentation with summary jury trials.9 The use of ADR
devices raises the question of the extent to which federal courts, in
the pursuit of settlements, may impose such mechanisms upon
litigants.10
The summary jury trial, a popular yet controversial ADR option, is
an abbreviated trial at which a jury renders a non-binding verdict.
The procedure is designed to improve the accuracy of the litigants'
expectations about trial outcomes at a lower cost than proceeding
through traditional forms of litigation. Proponents of the summary
jury trial assert that the device makes settlement substantially more
likely and averts full trials in over ninety percent of the cases.1 '
However, several commentators have criticized the procedure by em-
as models for other jurisdictions, and on experiments that do not survive the
scrutiny of careful testing.
1983 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 17-18.
5. Other options to alleviate the congested dockets include further amending the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and curtailing or limiting district court jurisdiction
over certain types of actions, such as diversity cases. See Rosenberg Report, supra note
1.
6. Much has been written extolling the virtues of ADR. Many authors have as-
serted that ADR should play a major role in improving the catastrophic problems
faced by today's federal district courts. See, e.g., J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. STANTON,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESS IN EVOLUTION 34-38 (1984); Cook, A Quest
for Justice: Effective and Efficient ADR Processes, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1129.
7. See Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
8. See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dis-
pute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) [hereinafter Lambros]; Lambros, The Judge's
Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1363 [hereinafter Judge's
Role]; Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980);
Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986); Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829
(1986).
9. See, e.g., W.D. MICH. CIv. R. 44 (West 1986); N.D. OHIO LOCAL R. 17.02 (Ander-
son 1988); W.D. OKLA. R. 17(I) (West 1988).
10. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 668 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial & Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cau-
tionary Observations, 53 U. CHI L. REV. 366 (1986); Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
11. Lambros, supra note 8, at 472; see Marcotte, Summary Jury Trials Touted, 73
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phasizing the need to preserve traditional forms of adversarial litiga-
tion, and noting that the added procedural layer increases costs and
potentially prejudices the parties.12 One writer has doubted the pro-
claimed efficiency of the summary jury trial.13 Finally, some federal
court rulings have questioned the foundational basis for requiring
parties to participate in the mandatory summary jury trial, even
though its results are non-binding.14 This criticism is troubling be-
cause it questions the legality of the process. Because of the intracta-
ble problems facing federal courts and the proclaimed successes of
the summary jury trial, inquiry into the court's authority to order
such a process is crucial. Only with the proper authority can federal
district courts experiment and systematically employ new methods to
effectively alleviate the increasing burden on the federal court
system.
This comment examines whether mandatory summary jury trials
are congressionally authorized or whether federal courts are exercis-
ing powers beyond their statutory mandate when they require liti-
gants to participate in such procedures. Part II explains the
summary jury trial process. Part III discusses the constitutionality of
summary jury trials and analyzes the various rules and theories upon
which courts and commentators rely to sustain the basis for this type
of program. Part IV concludes that despite the high praise and des-
perate demand for the innovative summary jury trial, federal district
courts may lack the necessary foundation to order such trials absent
statutory authorization by Congress' 5 or favorable United States
Supreme Court resolution.
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 27; see also Angiolillo & Tell, From Jury Selection to Ver-
dict-In Hours, Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 1987, at 48.
12. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Huppert, Fairness & Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 1359
(1985).
13. No empirical study has substantiated its efficiency or compared its results to
other settlement techniques. Posner, supra note 10, at 382. Judge Richard Posner of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested that a cur-
sory review of the disposition statistics advances the opposite conclusion: The device
does not increase judicial efficiency. Id. at 381-83. Furthermore, it is often difficult to
decipher what factor advanced the settlement. The cases settled during or after the
summary jury trial may well have settled without the use of the technique.
14. See infra Part III.
15. Legislation has been proposed in Congress that would allow district courts to
convene mandatory summary jury trials. See H.R. 473, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REC. H157 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion
Act of 1987); S. 2038, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. S848 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986)
(Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act of 1986).
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II. THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROCESS
The pretrial settlement of a case provides a cost savings to the par-
ties, the judicial system, and the public at large. One aspect of this
savings is the elimination of selecting a jury. Some cases, however,
are not amenable to settlement through the common methods of dis-
pute resolution for a variety of reasons. Often, litigants refuse to
compromise without first having their "day in court"--an opportu-
nity to tell their version of the story.16 Before hearing both sides of
the case presented to an objective panel of factfinders, lawyers and
their clients may not recognize the weaknesses of their case and ac-
cordingly will make unreasonable demands in settlement negotia-
tions. 17 Even parties aware of the flaws in their case may believe
they still can "win" or at least fare better by appealing to a jury.'8
This barrier to settlement often leads to protracted litigation and
expense.
The summary jury trial19 presents a solution which seeks to break
down this barrier and avoid long trials which clog the dockets and
drain federal resources.20 Alternatively, the summary jury trial can
help streamline the subsequent jury trial by limiting the issues to be
litigated.21 The summary jury trial is inherently different from other
ADR devices. This distinction manifests itself through use of the
traditional concept of trial by jury. It is the verdict by a jury of one's
peers which allows the parties to believe that their case has been
heard and an impartial decision reached.22 Summary jury trials ap-
peal to the emotional sense of justice, consistent with the American
justice system's concepts of ventilation and confrontation in a struc-
16. Lambros, supra note 8, at 468; Judge's Role, supra note 8, at 1374.
17. See Lambros, supra note 8, at 468. This author responds, however, that it is
easy to ascertain the defects in one's position without the help of adversaries.
18. Lambros, supra note 8, at 468; Judge's Role, supra note 8, at 1374.
19. This device was introduced in March 1980 by federal district Judge Thomas
Lambros in the Northern District of Ohio. Posner, supra note 10, at 368, 377 & n.21;
see Judge's Role, supra note 8, at 1373. For examples of the summary jury trial in ac-
tion, see Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey Canada, Inc., Civ. No. 3-86-185 (D. Minn. Nov.
17, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 135862, ALLFEDS library); Negin v. City of Mentor, 601 F.
Supp. 1502, 1505 (N.D."Ohio 1985); Rocco Wine Distribs., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Wine
Co., 596 F. Supp. 617, 620-621 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
20. However, some commentators have argued that settlement is achieved when
parties are unsure of the evidence or theories possessed by their adversaries:
[T]he most important factor in the making of settlements is the fear of un-
known evidence in the possession of one's opponents.... [T]he mutual fear of
unknown factors creates a greater desire to settle than is present if each party
already knows exactly what the other side's evidence will be and has had an
opportunity to prepare his case accordingly.
Watson, The Settlement Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL. B.J. 480, 489-90 (1967) (emphasis
in original). Thus, the summary jury trial may encourage parties to solidify their
positions.
21. Lambros, supra note 8, at 468.
22. Id.; Judge's Role, supra note 8, at 1374.
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tured adversarial system. No other alternative dispute mechanism
uses this basic foundation of our -present judicial system..
The summary jury trial is simply an abbreviated trial without the
presentation of testimony. It consists of a brief voir dire by the court
to select a six-person panel of jurors, a preliminary instruction on the
law, and opening statements by counsel. Counsel then have roughly
one hour each to present the evidence, factually summarizing the an-
ticipated testimony of potential witnesses and offering exhibits that
would be admissible in a subsequent trial. After counsel make their
closing arguments, the court instructs the jury on the law and the
jury renders its advisory verdict. 23 The jury may return a consensus
or, if unable to agree, individual verdicts.24
The summary jury trial is a flexible device that helps considerably
in the pre-trial settlement of trial-bound cases. 25 The process is not
confined to any particular type of action.26 However, the summary
jury trial is not always appropriate. The court has the discretion to
determine whether the procedure is suitable. For example, courts
typically convene summary jury trials where there has been a jury
demand in a protracted case which relies heavily upon circumstantial
evidence as opposed to those cases where the credibility of witnesses
is paramount.27
The summary jury trial can be an effective predictive process for
23. Spiegel, supra note 8, at 829. Some lawyers protest the partiality and overstat-
ing of evidence in the presentations by counsel, despite even the most earnest efforts
to be factual. Id. at 835-36.
24. Lambros, supra note 8, at 471.
25. Over 65 different federal district courts have utilized the summary jury trial
device. Marcotte, supra note 11, at 27. Federal districts that presently employ the
summary jury trial mechanism include: Southern District of Florida, Southern Dis-
trict of Illinois, District of Massachusetts, Eastern District of Michigan, Western Dis-
trict of Michigan, District of Montana, Northern District of Ohio, Southern District of
Ohio, Western District of Oklahoma, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Id.
26. The summary jury trial has been successfully used in the following types of
actions: negligence, products liability, toxic tort, personal injury, contract, discrimina-
tion, admiralty and antitrust. Lambros, supra note 8, at 472.
27. Spiegel, supra note 8, at 835. Some lawyers maintain, however, that they al-
ways depend on a jury's response to the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. The
complexity of a case may be a factor weighing against employing the summary jury
trial. Additionally, situations may arise where parties will want to avoid the summary
jury trial in order to prevent their opponents from previewing their case. When settle-
ment is at an impasse or there is an appearance of bad faith, a party may conclude that
the summary jury trial offers no benefit worth exposing its strategy.' See Maatman,
The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v., Jackson County,
21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 484 (1988).
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determining the ultimate outcome of a case.28 The uncertainty of a
jury's verdict--often the sole bar to settlement-is therefore reduced.
The role of the summary jury has been likened to that of a weather
forecaster.29 While there is a recognized margin of error in both
weather and future jury predictions, the goal of the court is to reduce
the margin of error in the latter. This paves the way for a more real-
istic possibility of settlement. 30 The proceeding, which usually lasts
from one half day to two days,31 is designed to provide a "no risk
method by which parties can get the perception of jurors on the mer-
its of their case without a large investment of time or money."3 2
Where the summary jury trial does not culminate in settlement, the
value of the process is not diminished. The summary jury trial crys-
tallizes the issues and ensures full preparation by the parties.
The proceeding is purely advisory unless the parties agree to be
bound by a consensus verdict, in no way affecting the parties' right to
a full trial on the merits.33 The process is merely a predictive tool
that gives parties a reliable basis for building an acceptable settle-
ment. The summary jury trial permits counsel "to achieve a just re-
sult for their clients at minimum expense."3 4
III. LEGALITY OF THE MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
There are two factors in determining the legality of court-ordered
summary jury trials.3 5 First, there is the question of its constitution-
ality. Second, there is the question of the federal court's authority to
employ it. Only if the process satisfies both considerations can the
federal courts continue to require the use of summary jury trials.
A. Constitutionality of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial
The United States Constitution gives civil litigants in federal court
the right to be heard by a federal judge.36 Typically, the summary
jury trial is conducted by a district court judge, thus satisfying this
28. For a discussion concerning the reliability of summary jury verdicts and its
role in furthering settlement, see Jacoubovitch & Moore, Summary Jury Trials in the
Northern District in Ohio, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 9-33 (May 1982).
29. Judge's Role, supra note 8, at 1371.
30. Lambros, supra note 8, at 468.
31. Id. at 469; Spiegel, supra note 8, at 830.
32. Lambros, supra note 8, at 469.
33. Id.; Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 46.
34. Lambros, supra note 8, at 469; Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 46.
35. The consensual summary jury trial has not been challenged. Although courts
have intimated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the court to conduct
the summary jury trial with the consent of the parties, its legality has not been fully
explored. See Maatman, supra note 27, at 477. The voluntary practice is therefore
outside the scope of this discussion.
36. Article III, section 1 provides in pertinent part: "The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall,
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constitutional entitlement. Often, however, a federal magistrate pre-
sides over the summary jury trial upon assignment by the district
court.3 7 This creates no violation of the right because the resulting
jury verdict is non-binding. The parties, therefore, have the opportu-
nity to a de novo trial on the merits before a federal judge.3 8
The United States Constitution affords civil litigants the right of
trial by jury39 in which parties are not "deprived of ... property,
without due process of law."4 0 Because the parties are entitled to a
jury in the de novo trial, the summary jury trial does not infringe
upon this seventh amendment right. However, the fifth amendment
raises some concern. The summary jury trial requires parties to
show, in advance, their trial strategy. This may hinder the perform-
ance of counsel at the trial on the merits and thereby affect the out-
come. To the extent that the exposed strategy at the summary jury
trial interferes with the delicate balance created by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,41 due process rights may be in jeopardy.42
Nonetheless, absent proof that the revealed strategy influenced the
subsequent verdict, the otherwise unaffected de novo trial satisfies
due process requirements. 43
at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
37. Lambros, supra note 8, at 470.
38. This is a horizontal process from summary jury trial to trial on the merits, and
is not to be seen as appellate review. Because the verdict is not admissable at the full
trial, it is certainly less intrusive than other procedures by which a determination on a
non-dispositive matter may be accorded great weight by the subsequent trier of fact.
See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (due process to determine credibility
requires only a de novo determination, not a full hearing).
39. The seventh amendment provides in pertinent part: "In suits at common law,
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982 & Supp. 1988), reflects the
joint responsibility of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government in
balancing the competing concerns of effective judicial management and protection of
individual rights. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
42. Judge Arthur Spiegel of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, Seventh Circuit, argues that the likelihood of such a deprivation is
remote because no surprises, blindsiding or ambushing methods are tolerated in fed-
eral courts. See Spiegel, supra note 8, at 835. However, this contention is not respon-
sive to the disclosure of trial strategy which undermines the concept underlying the
American system of justice that allows a party to present his case as he deems best.
See Maatman, supra note 27, at 471.
43. Attorneys complain about the extra work and expense for their clients due to
the added layer of litigation. If a summary jury succeeds, it certainly cuts down on the
time and money otherwise spent continuing the litigation. If settlement does not re-
sult, the work of counsel and the court has not been wasted; the trial on the merits
will be streamlined and scheduled shortly thereafter. See Spiegel, supra note 8, at 835.
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B. Authority for the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial
Since its inception, the mandatory summary jury trial mechanism
has been challenged by at least one court which questioned federal
court authority to coerce participation.44 Federal courts have limited
jurisdiction, and their power is not self-executing; it must be author-
ized by Congress.45 Congress has delegated authority to these courts
through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (federal rules).46
Therefore, when determining whether or not a procedure is within
the scope of its judicial power, courts must look to the federal rules.
Is the court-ordered summary jury trial within the parameters of the
judicial power established by the federal rules?
District courts have the inherent power to manage and control
their dockets.47 Congress has empowered lower federal courts to is-
sue supplementary rules of procedure to conduct their business.48
These powers must be exercised in a manner harmonious with the
federal rules.49 To the extent that the mandatory summary jury trial
contravenes the balance instituted by the federal rules, the authority
by the federal courts to apply this procedure may be unavailable.
Courts have both relied upon and rejected the federal rules as the
statutory foundation for the mandatory summary jury trial.5 0 Be-
Furthermore, many court practices and procedures require time and expense to which
counsel have no redress.
44. Strandel v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987). One probable
reason for the lack of challenges in this area is the difficulty in appealing discovery
orders. Attempts to file a mandamus action or interlocutory appeal are usually unsuc-
cessful in the context of discovery orders. See Maatman, supra note 27, at 469 n.58. A
party may challenge a discovery order by way of criminal contempt; the party could
simply violate the order and appeal from the contempt judgment. The attendant risk
of punishment if the challenged order is upheld on appeal renders this route of limited
usefulness. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150,
1157 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). When plaintiffs' coun-
sel in Strandell refused to comply with the court's order to participate in the summary
jury trial, he was held in criminal contempt. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115
F.R.D. 333, 334 (S.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
45. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 446-49 (1850).
46. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The federal rules are the
result of a careful process designed to integrate "both . . . the need for expedition of
cases and the protection of individual rights." S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AMIN. NEWS 3023, 3026.
47. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
49. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1987); McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1988). Rule 83 states that a district court
may "make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with [the federal]
rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added).
50. The conflict is expressed by a split among the federal circuits. Compare
Strandell, 838 F. 2d at 888 (federal district court may not require litigants to participate
in non-binding summary jury trials) with McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49 (court may order
summary jury trial as a permissible settlement device) and Arabian Am. Oil Co. v.
Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (court may require parties to participate in
summary jury trial proceedings) and Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
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cause the federal rules do not detail specific authorized practices, the
conflict centers on the congressional intent behind the federal
rules.51
Rule 1 of the federal rules provides that the rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."52 This rule does not stand alone but serves as a back-
drop for interpretation of the subsequent rules.
Rule 16 governs the court's pretrial power to manage and control
its docket. Rule 16(a), concerning pretrial activities, provides:
In any action, the Court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the par-
ties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or con-
ferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the
action;... (4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough prepa-
ration; and, (5) facilitating the settlement of the case. 5 3
Rule 16's provisions do not grant courts the power to employ
mandatory summary jury trials.5 4 The plain language of Rule 16(a)
allows the court, at its discretion, to direct appearances for pretrial
"conferences." A summary jury trial is not a conference. It is a pro-
cedure far more intrusive than a conference. 55
Rule 16(c), concerning subjects to be discussed at pretrial confer-
ences, provides:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take ac-
tion with respect to... (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudi-
cial procedures to resolve the dispute; ... (10) the need for adopting special
117 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (district court has power to order summary jury trial
to which first amendment right of access to judicial proceedings does not attach).
51. Congressional intent need not always be expressed. Court have filled the un-
anticipated gaps in the statutory scheme. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957). Notably, the Supreme Court interpretations of a statute, with re-
spect to its ambiguity or its silence, are numerous. The test varies with the Court's
attitude toward judicial activism. Compare Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916) (implying a private right of action under the Federal Safety Appliance Act of
1910) with Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private
right of action under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). With the shift since
1976 toward strict interpretation, the ultimate decision of the Court may well reflect a
restrictive view of what power 28 U.S.C. § 2071 confers to federal district courts.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
54. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887 (parameters of rule 16 do not permit courts to
compel parties to participate in summary jury trial); but see Federal Reserve Bank v.
Carey Canada, Inc., Civ. No. 3-86-185 (D. Minn. Nov. 17, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW 135862,
ALLFEDS Library) (district court has inherent power under rules 1 and 16 to compel
participation in summary jury trial); McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48-49; Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
119 F.R.D. at 448 (rule 16 furnishes authorization for courts to compel summary jury
trial).
55. But see Arabian Am. Oil Co., 119 F.R.D. at 448 ("Rule 16 calls these procedures
conferences, but what is in a name.").
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procedures for managing potential difficult or protracted actions that may in-
volve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual
proof problems; and (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of
the action. 5
6
The drafters of rule 16 certainly intended to provide "a neutral fo-
rum" for discussing the possibility of settlement.57 Rule 16(c) states
that "participants at any conference under this rule may consider and
take action with respect to... (7) the use of extrajudicial procedures
. . . [and] (10) the need for adopting special procedures." The sum-
mary jury trial is "hardly an extrajudicial procedure."58 The proce-
dure is conducted inside the courtroom in a federal courthouse,
before an article III judge, with jurors chosen from the court's ordi-
nary pool who are paid with congressionally allocated funds.5 9
Although the summary jury trial falls within the meaning of "special
procedure," this subsection and the advisory committee's notes
merely contemplate the discussion, not the implementation, at the
pretrial conference of employing experimental devices.60 After all,
the title of the subsection is "subjects to be discussed" at the pretrial
conference. Therefore, at the mandatory pretrial conference, the
parties may discuss and agree to use the summary jury trial device.
Rule 16 was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be
sidetracked from the normal course of litigation.6 1 The advisory
committee's note makes it clear that it was "not the purpose of Rule
16[(c)] to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants."6 2
Furthermore, the note states that "[t]he rule does not make settle-
ment conferences mandatory because they would be a waste of time
in many cases." 63
Although settlement is desirable, the court may not pursue it at all
costs. As the Second Circuit, commenting on the 1983 version of rule
16, noted: "Rule 16... was not designed as a means for clubbing the
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (emphasis added).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
58. See Maatman, supra note 27, at 478; Posner, supra note 10, at 385-86.
59. See Maatman, supra note 27, at 478.
60. See Posner, supra note 10, at 385; but see McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120
F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335 (S.D.
Ill. 1987) rev'd, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); Lambros, supra note 8, at 469-70.
61. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1525 (Supp. 1988) ("[T]his new subdivi-
sion does not force unwilling parties into settlement negotiations."). The argument
that distinguishes between forcing settlement and forcing settlement negotiations is
not tenable in circumventing the explicit language in the advisory committee's note.
See Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 336 (language in comments does not preclude court order-
ing process to enhance possibility of fruitful negotiations); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 848 F.2d 1415, 1424 (7th Cir. 1988) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note. See Flanders, Case Management
& Court Management in the United States District Courts, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER 37-39 (Sept. 1977).
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parties--or one of them-into an involuntary compromise."8 4 The
rule 16 pretrial conference was intended to be "informational and
factual" rather than coercive.6 5
While the drafters intended to facilitate settlement by permitting
the trial judge to "explor[e] the use of procedures other than litiga-
tion to resolve the dispute," including "urging the litigants to employ
adjudicatory techniques," clearly they did not intend to mandate par-
ticipation by the parties.6 6 The drafters' commentary with respect to
the other parts of the rule substantially reinforces this noncoercive
interpretation of rule 16. The last sentence of rule 16(c), added in
1983, reads: "At least one of the attorneys for each party participat-
ing in any conference before trial shall have authority to enter into
stipulations and to make admissions regarding all matters that the
participants may reasonably anticipate may be discussed." 67 The
drafters' note describes the amendment: "The reference to 'author-
ity' is not intended to insist upon the ability to settle the litigation.
Nor should the rule be read to encourage the judge conducting the
conference to compel attorneys to enter into stipulations or to make
admissions that they consider to be unreasonable. '"6 8 This subsection
was designed solely to ensure proper pretrial conference preparation
so that the conference is more than ceremonial.
Federal rule 83 provides: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district judges and magistrates may regulate their practices in any
manner not inconsistent with [the federal rules or any local rules]."69
Because the mandatory summary jury trial is inconsistent with rule
64. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (failure of physician to offer to
settle claim for $20,000, as urged by federal district court during pretrial conference,
did not warrant imposition of sanctions after claim was settled for $20,000 after one
day of trial). Cf. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 848 F.2d at 1420 (court cannot force person
to attend pretrial conference if he is a represented party). Other circuit court decisions
issued prior to the 1983 version of rule 16 substantiate this noncoercive view. See In-
dentiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., Inc., 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977) (district
court lacked power to order a party to undertake further discovery because rule 16
was noncoercive); J. F. Edward Const. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542
F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976) (district court could not use rule 16 to compel parties to stipu-
late to that which they could not voluntarily agree). Although these cases antedate
the amendments to rule 16, nothing in the amended rule or in the advisory commit-
tee's notes suggests that the changes were intended to make the rule coercive.
65. J. F. Edwards Constr. Co., 542 F.2d at 1323 (quoting Clark, To an Understand-
ing Use of Pretrial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 456 (1961)).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added).
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16,70 rule 83 offers no basis to sustain the practice. 71 Rule 83 further
provides that each district court may "make and amend rules gov-
erning its practice not inconsistent with [the federal rules]." 72 Dis-
trict courts have implemented local rules which allow them to
employ the summary jury trial procedure. 73 Because the mandatory
summary jury trial is inconsistent with rule 16, relying on a local dis-
trict court rule as a basis for the mandatory summary jury trial is
equally as inappropriate as relying on rule 83.
Federal rule 39(c) permits the district court, "[iun all actions not
triable of right by a jury," to "try any issue with an advisory jury."74
Note, however, that the summary trial jury is not a traditional advi-
sory jury in that it does not advise the judge how to decide a case, 75
but rather provides an inducement to settle. Therefore, summary
jury trials fall outside the parameters of rule 39(c). 76 Furthermore,
the rule excludes the summary jury trial because it is used in actions
triable of right by a jury.77
Additionally, the mandatory summary jury trial as a pretrial settle-
ment device seriously affects the well established rules concerning
70. See text accompanying notes 50-68.
71. Several sources cite rule 83 as a foundation for court-ordered summary jury
trial, in that the procedure is not inconsistent with the federal rules and particularly
Rule 16. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Lambros,
supra note 8, at 470. By independently relying on rule 83 as a statutory basis for au-
thorizing mandatory summary jury trials, these sources bootstrap their argument. The
premise that this argument depends on (i.e., that it is not inconsistent) is false, and
therefore destroys the rule 83 authority. Cf G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 848 F.2d 1418, 1421 (7th Cir. 1988) (district court order to defendant to send rep-
resentative other than its attorney to court-ordered settlement conference was incon-
sistent with federal rules because rule 16 does not authorize court to order represented
parties to appear); J. F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp.,
542 F.2d 1318, 1322 (7th Cir. 1976) (standing order that arguably mandated counsel to
stipulate facts was inconsistent with federal rules because no federal rule authorized
court to order counsel to stipulate facts).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added).
73. For example, rule 23 of the Eastern & Western Districts of Kentucky reads:
"A judge may, in his discretion, set any civil case for summary jury trial or other alter-
nate method of dispute resolution." Such rules, on their face, do not exceed the au-
thority given by Congress because they do not include language of compulsion. Some
rules, however, have been construed, based on the original intent of the drafters, to
include mandatory summary jury trials. See McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44 n.3. Because this
constuction of the local rule is inconsistent with rule 16, the local rule is invalid. I&
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
75. As the advisory committee's note explains, rule 39(c) codifies the traditional
practice in equity, maritime law, and other nonjury fields whereby the judge could
choose to convene a jury to advise him on questions of fact. See, e.g., Kohn v. McNulta,
147 U.S. 238, 240 (1893); Cities Serv. Co. v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 758 F.2d
1063, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1985); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICES & PROCE-
DURE § 2335 (1971).
76. See Posner, supra note 10, at 385.
77. Id.
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discovery and work product privilege.78 These rules reflect a care-
fully created balance between the competing concerns for pretrial
disclosure and party confidentiality. 79 The compelled summary jury
trial could easily tip the balance by requiring disclosure of informa-
tion obtainable, if at all, through the mandated discovery process. It
is, therefore, unreasonable to assume that "the Supreme Court and
Congress would undertake, in such an oblique fashion, such a radical
alteration of the considered judgments contained in Rule 26 and the
case law."80
The 1984 Judicial Conference formally endorsed "the experimental
use of summary jury trials as a potentially effective means of promot-
ing the fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury
cases."8 1 The phrase "experimental use" replaced language limiting
the endorsement to those summary jury trials held "only with the
voluntary consent of the parties."82 "Experimental use" incorporates
voluntariness, as emphasized by the conference's failure to use the
word "mandatory."
There can be no dispute that a congested docket places greater
stress on a court's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. Nor can it be
denied that the exigencies of modern caseloads demand novel and
imaginative alternatives. Nonetheless, "a crowded docket does not
permit a court to avoid the adjudication of cases properly within its
congressionally-mandated jurisdiction."8 3 Even the best of policy
objectives may not give district courts cause to expand the federal
rules. As stated by the Seventh Circuit, "Innovative experiments
may be admirable, and considering the heavy case loads in the dis-
78. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838
F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1987); FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
79. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
80. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. Advocates of the mandatory summary jury trial as-
sert that this concern is misplaced. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 45, 48
(E.D. Ky. 1988) ("If... the summary jury trial prevents a litigant from saving some
juicy tidbit as a surprise for the trial a la Perry Mason, the pretrial orders.., are sup-
posed to do the same thing. The trial by ambush has long been abolished from the
federal system."). Id.
81. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 88 (Sept. 1984).
82. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335 (S.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd, 838
F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). The allegation that the deletion of the consensual language
authorizes the mandatory summary jury trial fails to account for other changes made
to the initial draft. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48. Furthermore, the Judicial Conference is
not the Congress and is in no better position to analyze rule 16 than are the individual
district courts themselves.
83. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888; see Thermtron Prods. Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336 (1976).
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trict courts, understandable, but experiments must stay within the
limitations of the statute."84
IV. CONCLUSION
Not all judicial power need be expressly delegated by Congress.
Lack of clear authority, however, is reason for hesitation in sensitive
areas. The fact that Congress appropriates money for jurors without
indicating how jurors are to be used does not empower federal judges
to summon jurors to serve as mediators.8 5 Despite valid policy objec-
tives in alleviating the crisis of growing dockets, federal courts pres-
ently lack the authority to convene summary jury trials without the
consent of the parties involved.86 Only adoption of legislation8 7 or
favorable Supreme Court determination can empower the courts to
compel participation in summary jury trials. Supreme Court atten-
tion to this controversy may resolve the problem before legislation is
adopted, but through legislation, Congress has the final word to effec-
tuate its intent. Until then, despite the proclaimed benefits of the
process, federal courts should not order the summary jury trial
against the will of the parties.
NINA JILL SPIEGEL*
84. Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978).
85. See Jury Selection & Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 54 (codi-
fied as amended at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1862-69, 1871 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)).
86. The contention is that, even where participation is compelled, the process is
nonetheless consensual because the verdict is non-binding. Lieberman & Henry, supra
note 8, at 436-37 n.53. This defies common sense, and is without merit.
87. See supra note 15.
* Third-year law student, Fordham University School of Law.
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